This paper examines the relationship between the sustainability level and tax evasion and tests whether the level of corruption moderates such a relationship. Tax evasion is measured using the macro indirect approach based on Schneider, Buehn and Monterngro (2010). Sustainability level and corruption variable are collected from The Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-2013. Based on a sample of 65 developed and developing countries, we find that the level of tax evasion is negatively associated with the level of sustainability (overall score and social and environmental score) and the quality of infrastructure. When we distinguish between low-and high-corruption countries, we find that this negative association is significant for lowcorruption countries and insignificant for high-corruption settings. These results imply that the level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular. Our empirical findings have policy implications for governments with high levels of tax evasion since they highlight the importance of states' engagements towards their citizens in reducing the tax evasion.
Introduction
Although audits and fiscal authorities' controls exist, tax evasion 1 represents a widespread phenomenon for both developed and developing countries that may considerably affect public revenues due to the lack of tax compliance (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006) . Understanding the determinants of tax evasion is crucial for governments that seek to reduce the level of tax evasion in society (Richardson, 2008) .
Given this importance, this topic has been gaining major interests in tax literature during the last decade (e.g., Alm and Torgler, 2006; Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano, 2007) . These studies have considered several variables to explain tax evasion including demographic, legal and behavioral characteristics.
A tax system is a social contract that promises citizens that in exchange for participating in the economy by paying taxes, government will finance the overall state welfare (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004 ). Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests that future research may expand the determinants to include social and environmental norms in order to contribute to an efficient public policy on the topic. Our empirical investigation is further motivated by the recent literature review conducted by Khlif and Achek (2014) that summarises the cross-country empirical studies dealing with the determinants of tax evasion. In their review, they explicitly call for an empirical investigation of the effect country's level of social and environmental sustainability on tax evasion since tax compliance is a type of social contract between government and its citizens.
However, there is no study, to date, that examines the effect of country's sustainability level on tax evasion. Our paper replies to these research calls and fills an important research gap in the 1 Tax evasion is defined as a behavior involving a direct violation of fiscal rules to escape the payment of tax (Richardson, 2008) . The deliberate under-reporting of income and over-claiming of tax deductions are examples of tax evasion (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), 2001, 134) .
literature by being the first to examine the impact of sustainability level on tax evasion. We also examine whether the level of corruption affects the sustainability-tax evasion relationship.
Using a sample of 65 developed and developing countries, the level of tax evasion is negatively associated with the level of sustainability (overall score and social and environmental score) and the quality of infrastructure. When we distinguish between low-and high-corruption countries, we find that this negative association is significant for low-corruption countries and insignificant for high-corruption countries. These results imply that the level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular (Slemrod, 2002; Slemrod and Katuscak, 2002) . In addition, a high corrupt environment may increase the feeling among citizens that they do not owe anything to the government because it does not respect the terms of social contract established between them. Our empirical findings have policy implications for governments having high levels of tax evasion since they highlight the importance of state's engagement towards its citizens in the reducing of tax noncompliance.
We offer two major contributions to tax literature. First, the paper is being of the first to examine the impact of different sustainability scores on tax evasion. Second, we are also the first to examine the extent to which corruption level may affect the association between sustainability and tax evasion. These findings have policy implications for governments that seek to reduce the level of tax evasion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops theoretical bases for the association between sustainability and tax evasion and formulates research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 summarizes and analyzes the empirical results of this study. Section 5 presents the conclusions, limitations and future research avenues.
Hypotheses development

Sustainability level and tax evasion
A tax system in a country is considered as social contract between taxpayers and their state. Based on these suggestions, we expect that a strong government commitment to increase the welfare in a country through social, environmental sustainability and the quality of infrastructure may encourage taxpayers to comply with tax legislation which implies low tax evasion level. By contrast, if citizens in a country do not receive in exchange with their compliance with tax rules a sufficient level of sustainability, this will discourage them to pay taxes. This implies that this country does not respect the social contract established with its citizens which translates into high level of tax non-compliance and thus high levels of tax evasion.
Based on legitimacy theory, we suggest that the commitment of one state to improve the overall welfare of one country represents a legitimacy signal for citizens in general and taxpayers in particular. Therefore, the state's sustainability effort may represent a signal for taxpayers showing the degree of commitments of governments towards their citizens. When taxpayers feel that their government does not make a transparent allocation of fiscal revenues; this might discourage them to comply with fiscal rules.
Prior empirical studies dealing with the determinants of tax evasion suggest that several factors may affect this variables including demographic variables (Richardson, 2006) , cultural dimensions (Gabor, 2012; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis, Curatola and Porcano, 2007) , legal and economic variables (Riahi-Belkoui, 2004; Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006) . A neglected aspect in tax evasion literature is the effect of sustainability effort undertaken by government on tax evasion. Accordingly, we build on these studies and expand them to explore how the level of sustainability in a country can affect taxpayers' behavior through tax evasion. Accordingly, it is expected that a high level of sustainability in one country will encourage citizens to comply strongly with tax rules and reduce the likelihood of tax evasion. We consider four levels of sustainability and set the following hypotheses:
The level of overall sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax evasion.
H2: The level of environmental sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax evasion.
H3: The level of social sustainability is negatively associated with the level of tax evasion.
H4: The quality of infrastructure is negatively associated with the level tax evasion.
The moderating effect of corruption on the association between sustainability and tax evasion
Corruption is defined as the exercise of public power to private gain (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006) . Corruption involves an operation in which one agent typically pays a sum of money or performs a service in exchange for an illicit act by a public official (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998) . High level of corruption, in a given country, is likely to reduce the tendency of individuals to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax burden in particular (Slemrod, 2002; Slemrod and Katuscak, 2002) . In addition, a high corrupt environment may increase the feeling among citizens that they do not owe anything to the government because it does not do anything for them (McGee, 1999b) .
Corruption may also reduce the sustainability effort made by government. For instance, Morse (2006) provides evidence that level of corruption reduces environmental sustainability. By reducing the level of corruption, government may increase the value of sustainability effort and increase the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, this is referred as tax morale motivation (Frey, 1994 (Frey, , 1997a . Therefore, we try to explore how the level of corruption may moderate the association between the level of sustainability and tax evasion. Based on the above discussion, we expect that the negative association between sustainability and tax evasion will be more significant for countries characterized by low corruption level. Thus, we set the following hypothesis: 
Research design
In this study we consider four sustainability dimensions and we test their effects on tax evasion for a sample of 65 developed and developing countries. These sustainability dimensions are classified into four categories including an overall sustainability score, environmental sustainability score, social sustainability score and the quality of infrastructure. Data for this study are collected from a public range of public sources. Appendix 1 provides a description of the data employed to measure the different variables used and their various sources.
Sample
The sample for this study consists of 65 countries. The justice tax network reports the cost of tax abuse for 145 countries, while the Global competitiveness report (2012 -2013) 
Independent variables
The Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-2013 defines sustainability as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that make the country competitive over a long period while ensuring environmental and social sustainability. Accordingly, we consider the overall sustainability score for each country and sub-scores for social and environmental sustainability.
The Global Competitiveness Report considers three indicators for environmental sustainability including the environmental policy, the use of renewable resources and degradation of environment. The report considers also three indictors for social sustainability including the access for basic necessities, vulnerability to shocks and social cohesion 4 . Finally, we consider the quality of infrastructure for each country. All these variables are measured using a survey among a sample of individuals from each country raging from 1 for low level of sustainability and low quality of infrastructure to 7 for high level of sustainability and high quality of infrastructure. Table 3 shows the sustainability scores for countries included in our analysis
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The minimum values for sustainability are obtained for Pakistan with 2.900, 2.960 and 2.840
for the overall, environmental and social sustainability scores respectively, whereas the maximum values are for Switzerland and they account for 6.850, 6.870 and 6.830 respectively for the overall, environmental and social sustainability scores. With regard to the quality of infrastructure, the maximum value is for Germany (6.400), while the minimum value is obtained for Tanzania (2.300).
The moderating variable: the level of corruption
The importance of corruption in one economy may affect the level of sustainability (Morse, 2006) and tax evasion (Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006) . In our study, the level of corruption is measured as the he weight of corruption as the most problematic factor in doing business (a percentage). From a list of 16 factors including corruption, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic and rank them from 1 (most problematic) to 5. The results were then tabulated and weighted according to the ranking assigned by respondents.
Control variables
Based on the previous empirical literature dealing the determinants of tax evasion, we consider economic, cultural and legal and institutional variables. With respect to economic variables, Quirk (1997) 
Models specification
To assess the empirical validity of the hypotheses formulated above, the following OLS 6 regressions are estimated. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity between sustainability scores and the quality of infrastructure, each variable is tested separately. Accordingly, the following regression models are performed: 
Test variables:
OSS = overall sustainability score; ESS = environmental sustainability score; SSS = social sustainability score; QIS = quality of infrastructure score;
Moderating variable:
COR = the level of corruption in one country;
Control variables:
GDP= gross domestic product per capita; MKS = market size; CTR = complexity of tax regulation; ID = individualism score for country i; PD = power distance score for country i; UA= uncertainty avoidance score for country i; MAS = masculinity score for country i;
LGS = a dummy variable: 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise.
Testing for the moderating effect of corruption level
In order to test hypothesis H5 which posits that the level of corruption may moderate the association between sustainability effort and tax evasion, we divide our overall sample into two sub-samples: (i) countries characterized by a low level of corruption (inferior or equal to the median of COR 7 ) and (ii) countries with high level of corruption (superior to the median). A test of hypothesis H5 consists of observing a negative and significant association between sustainability effort and tax evasion for low corruption countries, while we expect a nonsignificant or less significant relationship between sustainability effort and tax evasion for high corruption countries. This means that we regress the above four models for low and high corruption groups.
Empirical results and analysis
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are reported in table 4. For the dependent variable, tax evasion has a mean of 26.592 % and a range from 8.500 % to 58 %. Regarding the sustainability scores, OSS has a mean of 4.534 and a range from 2.900 to 6.850, ESS has a mean of 4.494 and a range from 2.960 to 6.870, SSS has a mean of 4.575 and a range from 2.840 to 6.830 and QIS has a mean of 4.556 and a range from 2.300 to 6.400. The largest standard deviation is obtained for SSS and it accounts for 1.059.
With respect to corruption level, the mean of this variable amounts to 8.104 % and ranges from 0 % to 20.800 %. The zero value for corruption indicates that no respondents to the survey conducted by the world economic forum consider corruption as the most problematic factors for doing business. This value is obtained for Australia and New Zealand, while the maximum value is obtained for Kenya. With regard to the complexity of tax regulation and the degree to which 7 The median of corruption in our sample accounts for 7.100. such a factor may represent the most problematic factor for doing business, the mean is about 7.244 % and ranges from a minimum value of 0.600 % for Trinidad and Tobago to a maximum value of 20.400 % for Poland.
With respect to cultural dimensions, individualism has a mean of 46.076 and a range from 8 to 91, power distance has a mean of 57.015 and a range from 11 to 100, uncertainty avoidance has a mean of 65.015 and a range from 13 to 100 and masculinity has a mean of 48.430 and a range from 5 to 100. Finally, 32.307 % of countries included in the analysis belong to common law legal system. Table 6 reports the results from estimating the multiple regressions specified in models (1), (2), (3) and (4). In model 1, our finding provides evidence that the overall sustainability score is negatively associated with tax evasion (Coeff = 4.271; t = -2.290). This result suggests that the higher the sustainability effort in one country, the higher the taxpayers' compliance with fiscal rules.
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Univariate analysis
With respect to control variable, the level of corruption is positively and significantly associated with tax evasion (Coeff = 0.531; t = 2.180). This result is in line with that previously reported by Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006) . In addition, masculinity has a significant negative effect These findings support the view that high a high degree of sustainability and a high infrastructure quality imply high tax compliance level and less tax evasion and thus H1 H2, H3
and H4 are supported. Therefore, a strong government commitment to increase the welfare in a country through social, environmental and the quality of infrastructure may encourage taxpayers to comply with tax legislation which implies low tax evasion. The findings also confirm the views of Cuccia (1994) and Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, and McKee (2001) who argue that the combination of economic and non-economic variables leads to a better understanding of the tax evasion determinants.
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The moderating effect of corruption on the association between sustainability and tax evasion
To test the moderating effect of corruption level on the relationship between sustainability and tax evasion (hypothesis H5), we divide the overall sample into countries characterized by high and low corruption.
With respect to the overall sustainability score (table 7, model 1), the relationship is negative and significant only for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -8.921; t = -4.240), while it is nonsignificant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -3.467; t = -0.850). This means that low corruption level implies more credibility of sustainability effort undertaken by government.
Taxpayers will have more trust in their government and comply more with fiscal rules. Under low corruption level, market size contributes also the reduction of tax evasion (Coeff = -3.960; t = -2.510) and legal system (common law countries) is associated with low tax evasion levels (Coeff = -10.029; t = -2.640). By contrast, legal system (common law countries) is associated with high tax evasion levels under high corruption levels (Coeff = 9.979; t = 2.150). It is worthy to note that the overall explanatory power, as proxied by the adjusted R-Square, has witnessed a improvement for low corruption countries moving from 53.610 % for the overall sample to 62.700 % for low corrupt environment, while it decreases for high corrupt environment since it amounts to 32.910%.
With respect to the environmental sustainability score (table 7, model 2), the relationship is negative and significant only for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -7.646; t = -3.380), while it is non-significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -2.133; t = -0.470). This means that low corruption level gives rise to the environmental sustainability effort undertaken by government among taxpayer. Under low corruption level, market size contributes also the reduction of tax evasion (Coeff = -3.990; t = -2.480) and legal system (common law countries)
is associated with low tax evasion levels (Coeff = -9.633; t = -2.290). By contrast, legal system (common law countries) and uncertainty avoidance are associated with high tax evasion levels under high corruption levels (Coeff = 10.159; t = 2.170) and (Coeff = 0.228; t = 2.250), while masculinity is negatively associated with tax evasion (Coeff = -0.168; t = -1.860). It should be noted here that the adjusted R-Square has witnessed a decrease for high corrupt environment since it amounts to 31.410%.
Similarly, corruption level also moderates the association between the social sustainability score and tax evasion since the relationship is negative and significant only for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -8.608; t = -4.540), while it is non-significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -3.740; t = -1.090). This means that a low corrupt environment increases the credibility of social sustainability effort undertaken by government and encourages taxpayers to comply more with fiscal rules. Under low corruption level, market size and legal system are negatively associated with tax evasion, while individualism is positively associated with the same variable. By contrast, under high corruption levels, legal system (common law countries) and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with tax evasion, while masculinity has a negative effect on the same variable. Similarly to model 1, the adjusted RSquare, has witnessed an improvement for low corruption countries moving from 54.750 % for the overall sample (model 3) to 64.920 % for low corrupt environment, while it decreases for high corrupt environment since it amounts to 34.250%.
Finally, the relationship between the quality of infrastructure and tax evasion (table 7, model 4) is negative and significant for low corrupt environment (Coeff = -7.501; t = -3.480), while it is less significant for high corrupt environment (Coeff = -5.502; t = -2.060). This implies that a high quality of infrastructure encourages taxpayers to comply more with fiscal rules with a more significant effect under low corrupt environment. Under low corruption level, legal system (common law countries) is negatively associated with low tax evasion levels (Coeff = -7.805; t = -1.970). Under high corruption level, legal system (common law countries) and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with high tax evasion levels, while masculinity is negatively associated with the same variable. The adjusted R-Square witnesses a decrease for high corrupt environment since it accounts for 41.900%, while it was about 55.980 % for model 4.
Overall, it seems that the level of corruption moderates the association between the level of sustainability and tax evasion and thus H5 is confirmed. For instance, taxpayers trust more a sustainability effort undertaken by a state operating under a low corrupt environment leading to more tax compliance. In addition, the level of corruption moderates the association between legal system and tax evasion since tax compliance is higher in common law countries characterized by low corruption level. Finally, the effect of cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and individualism) on tax evasion is also moderated by the level of corruption.
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Conclusion
The determinants of tax evasion on cross-county basis have been gaining major interests in tax literature following the pioneering work of Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) . A neglected aspect in empirical literature is the effect of sustainability effort undertaken by government on tax evasion since tax system represents a implicit contract between the individual and the state guaranteeing social and environmental welfare in exchange of high tax compliance.
Accordingly, this study expands this stream of research by examining the effect of the overall, social, environmental sustainability and the quality of infrastructure on tax evasion since recent international reports (e.g. World Economic Forum) publish figures dealing with sustainability efforts in many countries.
OLS regression analysis shows that the sustainability variables have a significant negative effect on tax evasion. Accordingly, a higher sustainability effort undertaken by government in one country translates into higher taxpayers' compliance with fiscal rules. In addition, corruption level moderates such an association since the negative and significant association is more pronounced in countries characterized by low corruption level. These results imply that a high level of corruption may reduce the tendency of individuals in a given state to accept and trust their government in general and comply with the tax rules in particular.
These specific insights should help government policy-makers to gain a better understanding of the importance of sustainability in a given state as a key determinant of tax evasion internationally, and design and implement appropriate strategies to minimize its damaging effects. This should lead to improvements in tax revenue collection and allocation by governments. Empirical findings, in this study, also alert government about the adverse effect of low level of sustainability and corruption on the public revenues due to the lack of tax compliance. The findings are of great value to developing and emerging economies that need to reduce the level of corruption in an attempt to create the type of tax morale conducive to both tax compliance and economic development.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, the sample size of 65 countries is relatively small, which may decrease the reliability of empirical findings. However, this is a common problem of cross-country research (e.g. Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2008; Tsakumis et al., 2007) . Second, tax evasion is measured using the macro-indirect approach while other micro-direct approach exists. However, these alternative measures are not available in recent international reports to be integrated in the analysis. Finally, some independent variables (corruption, tax regulation) are proxied using survey data measures which raise concerns about measurement error. However, the data are collected from reputable sources (e.g
World Economic Forum) which may reduce this concern.
Future research on tax evasion may be extended as follows. First, variables relating to sanctions, probability of detection and religious beliefs might be analyzed, subject to the availability of reliable cross-country data. Second, extending the sample size to study how region characteristics moderates the determinants of tax evasion may also improve our understanding of the topic. Finally, using several measures of tax evasion is needed to give rise to the robustness of the results, subject also to availability of reliable cross-country data. LGS Legal system (common = 1; civil =0) Stulz and Williamson (2003) ( Number of observations 33 32 33 32 Notes: TEV: tax evasion level; OSS: overall sustainability score; ESS: environmental sustainability score, SSS: social sustainability score; QIS: quality of infrastructure score, GDP: GDP per capita in thousands of Dollars; MKS: market size; COR: corruption level; CTR: the level of tax regulation; ID: uncertainty avoidance score; PD: power distance score; UA: Uncertainty avoidance score; LGS: dummy variable: 1 if common law country and 0 otherwise.
